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Abstract
Toxic content detection aims to identify content that can offend
or harm its recipients. Automated classifiers of toxic content
need to be robust against adversaries who deliberately try to
bypass filters. We propose a method of generating realistic
model-agnostic attacks using a lexicon of toxic tokens, which
attempts to mislead toxicity classifiers by diluting the toxicity
signal either by obfuscating toxic tokens through character-
level perturbations, or by injecting non-toxic distractor tokens.
We show that these realistic attacks reduce the detection recall
of state-of-the-art neural toxicity detectors, including those
using ELMo and BERT, by more than 50% in some cases. We
explore two approaches for defending against such attacks.
First, we examine the effect of training on synthetically noised
data. Second, we propose the Contextual Denoising Autoen-
coder (CDAE): a method for learning robust representations
that uses character-level and contextual information to de-
noise perturbed tokens.1 We show that the two approaches are
complementary, improving robustness to both character-level
perturbations and distractors, recovering a considerable por-
tion of the lost accuracy. Finally, we analyze the robustness
characteristics of the most competitive methods and outline
practical considerations for improving toxicity detectors.
Introduction
Toxic content on the internet prevents the constructive ex-
change of ideas, excludes sensitive individuals from online
dialogue, and inflicts mental and physical health impacts on
the recipients. Notable examples of toxic content include
hate speech and profanity. Given the sheer scale of internet
communications, manual filtering of such content is difficult,
requiring methods of automated filtering.
Previous work in toxic content classification has so far
focused on constructing classifiers that can flag toxic con-
tent with a high degree of accuracy on datasets curated
from sources such as Twitter and Wikipedia. However, these
datasets do not acknowledge the possibility for malicious
users to attempt to deliberately bypass these classifiers. In the
presence of toxic content filters, these users could formulate
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1Our code is publicly available at
github.com/keitakurita/robust toxicity detection.
Figure 1: Our proposed CDAE Architecture enhances the
Transformer model with character level information, allowing
for better handling of adversarial text.
adversarial attacks that aim to prevent the classifier from
detecting their harmful content while retaining readability for
the receiving user. For example, a change of a single charac-
ter to an asterisk, which requires minimal effort, may allow a
hurtful content to bypass the toxic content filter (e.g., “shut
up” to “s*ut up”).
If such simple attacks are effective at fooling automated
toxic content classifiers, the utility of these classifiers would
diminish greatly: determined users could still easily produce
toxic content at a large scale. Therefore, useful toxic content
classifiers need to be robust to adversarial attacks by making
the transmission of toxic content sufficiently difficult and
discouraging users from posting this type of content.
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of state-of-the-
art toxic content classifiers to realistic adversarial attacks
as well as various defenses against them. We find that these
classifiers are vulnerable to extremely simple, model-agnostic
attacks, with the toxic comment recall rate dropping by nearly
50% in some cases.
To address these vulnerabilities, we explore two types of
defenses. The first is adversarial training, which we find to be
effective against adversarial text, yet degrades performance
on clean data. We also propose the Contextual Denoising
Autoencoder (CDAE), a novel method for learning robust
representations. The CDAE uses character-level and contex-
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Dataset Source Usage Examples ToxicTraining Test (%)
Jigsaw Wikipedia Model 159K 64K 9.52018 comments train/eval
Jigsaw Wikipedia Background 1.78M n/a 5.92019 comments
OffensEval Twitter Model 13K 860 332019 train/eval
Table 1: Dataset Statistics
tual information to “denoise” obfuscated tokens. We find
that our approach outperforms several strong baselines with
respect to character-level obfuscations, but is still vulnerable
to distractors (i.e., injected sequences of non-toxic tokens).
We experimentally find that the two best-performing models
(our proposed CDAE and BERT) have different robustness
characteristics, but a model ensemble allows us to leverage
both their advantages.
Task and Datasets
Toxic content detection attempts to identify content that can
offend or harm its recipients, including hate speech (Wang
2018), racism (Waseem and Hovy 2016), and offensive lan-
guage (Wu, Kambhatla, and Sarkar 2018). Given the subjec-
tivity of these categorizations, we do not limit the scope of
our work to any specific type and address toxic content in
general. We work with three datasets summarized in Table 1.
The Jigsaw 2018 dataset focuses on the general toxic con-
tent detection task and it is comprised of approximately
215,000 annotated comments from Wikipedia talk pages
labeled by crowd workers. It provides both a general tox-
icity label and more fine-grained annotations such as severe
toxicity, obscenity, threat, insult, and identity hate.
The Jigsaw Unintended Bias in Toxicity Classification
dataset (Jigsaw 2019)2 extends the Jigsaw 2018 dataset with
1.8 million comments, each annotated by up to 10 annotators
for multiple labels. Jigsaw 2019 contains a field for toxicity
which provides the fraction of annotators who labeled the
comment as “toxic” (7.99% ≥0.5). We use the Jigsaw 2019
corpus as our background corpus for generating adversarial
attacks.
The OffensEval 20193 dataset consists of 13,240 tweets
annotated by crowdworkers. The data contains labels for
whether the content is offensive and whether it is targeted,
with 33% of the tweets being labeled as offensive.
Generating Realistic Adversarial Attacks
Previous work generating adversarial examples in text often
assumes access to either the weights (Ebrahimi et al. 2018;
Liang et al. 2017) or the raw prediction scores of the classifier
(Li et al. 2018; Liang et al. 2018; Alzantot et al. 2018; Gao et
al. 2018; Samanta and Mehta 2017). However, it is unlikely
that users would have access to this information. Instead, the
2Publicly available at https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-
unintended-bias-in-toxicity-classification/overview.
3https://competitions.codalab.org/competitions/20011
users most likely would only have weak signals from what
gets flagged as well as access to public datasets with toxicity
labels. To mimic this setup, we use a large background corpus
(Jigsaw 2019) with labels indicating toxicity.4 Our adversarial
attack consists of two steps: (1) constructing a lexicon of toxic
tokens and (2) using it to applying noise to the test set.
To identify “toxic” tokens, we train a logistic regression
classifier on bag-of-words utterance representations from our
background corpus. We use the coefficients of the logistic
regression classifier as a signed measure of the association
between the token and toxicity and select the 50,000 tokens
with the strongest positive association with toxicity to be
our toxic lexicon. We provide a list of top 100 toxic lexicon
tokens in the Supplemental Material. We treated any token
that did not appear in our lexicon as non-toxic. Using this
toxic lexicon, we generate noised versions of the corpora
using two settings: token obfuscation and distractor injection.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of all our proposed attacks.
Token Obfuscation
We apply character-level perturbations to the tokens of the
utterance that belong to our toxic lexicon. For each toxic to-
ken we randomly select one of the following three perturbing
operations: character scrambling, homoglyph substitution,
and dictionary-based near-neighbor replacement. Details of
the perturbing operations are given below.
Character scrambling consists in randomly permuting the
token’s characters without deletions and substitutions, as ap-
plied in other work (Heigold et al. 2018; Belinkov and Bisk
2018; Michel et al. 2019). Prior research shows that humans
can read sufficiently long scrambled words, albeit not without
an effort, especially if starting and ending letters remain in
place (Rayner, White, and Liversedge 2006). Thus, for this
operation, we ignore tokens with fewer than three charac-
ters and keep the first and the last character unchanged. The
remaining characters are split into groups of three consec-
utive characters and each group is permuted randomly and
independently.
Homoglyph substitution consists in replacing one or more
Latin letters with similar-looking international characters
from a handcrafted confusion map (see Supplemental Mate-
rial). If homoglyph substitution operation is selected, each
character of the toxic token is replaced with 20% probability.
This type of obfuscation is common in social media (Rojas-
Galeano 2017) and cybercrime (Ginsberg and Yu 2018;
Elsayed and Shosha 2018).
Dictionary-based near-neighbor replacement uses a base
vocabulary to find the closest (but distinct) token in terms of
Levenshtein distance. If relative Levenshtein distance (i.e.,
Levenshtein distance divided by maximum word length) is
greater than 0.75, we use this nearest neighbor as a replace-
ment. We leave the original toxic token unchanged otherwise.
This form of noise produces common misspellings. As such,
it introduces deletions, insertions, and substitutions that are
not overly artificial. This procedure is distinct from that used
4We follow Jigsaw 2019 guidelines for conversion of their con-
tinuous toxicity scores into binary labels.
Figure 2: An Example of a Noised Sentence
by Belinkov and Bisk (2018), who generate naturally occur-
ring errors using corpora of error corrections.
Distractor Injection
In this setting, we inject distractor tokens by repeating ran-
domly selected sequences of non-toxic tokens. We split the
utterance into two parts at a random position and find the
maximum-length sequence of non-toxic words that starts in
each of the parts. Search localization introduces variety in
the identified distractor sequences, which helps to avoid the
appearance of easily detectable vandalism. Once a suitable
sequence is found, it is appended to the end of the utterance.
Both, token obfuscation and distractor injection are model-
agnostic, simple, and subject to easy automation. Hence,
toxic content classifiers that are vulnerable to these attacks
can be easily and systematically exploited.
We emphasize that the noise we present here is differ-
ent from “naturally” occurring noise (e.g., misspellings and
slang) that does not deliberately attempt to hide toxic to-
kens. The datasets we use have not been constructed in the
presence of a toxicity filter, implying that the users had no
incentive to obfuscate toxicity of their comments. Hence,
the synthetic noise we present here is not the noise that we
observe frequently in these datasets.
Effect of Adversarial Noise
We have implemented an experiment to assess whether our
perturbations retained the toxicity of the toxic comments to
human readers. In that, we have randomly sampled 200 com-
ments from the Jigsaw 2018 dataset, half of which labeled
as toxic by original Jigsaw 2018 crowd-workers. For each
comment, we have a native English speaker rate either the
perturbed or unperturbed version of the comment, taking care
not to show both versions to the same individual. Overall,
our experiment involved 10 participants, with each individual
providing a toxicity rating for 80 comments. As such, we
have obtained a total of 800 ratings, with each version of
the comment receiving two independent ratings. We have
tested whether the toxicity rating of the unperturbed com-
ment tended to be higher than that of the perturbed comment
using the Wilcoxon signed rank test (Wilcoxon 1992) applied
to pairs of unperturbed/perturbed toxicity scores averaged at
the comment-level. The original comment was perceived as
more toxic (based on the average rating of two distinct users)
14% of the time and we found no statistically significant
difference at the 1% significance level. Thus, we conclude
that it is unlikely that our perturbations remove the toxicity
signals for human readers.
We evaluate the effect of our adversarial noise on toxic
content classifiers on the Jigsaw 2018 and OffensEval 2019
datasets 5 The general toxic content classifier architecture
is straightforward. The tokens x1, . . . , xT of an utterance
X are first embedded into a continuous vector space and
then passed through an LSTM encoder which produces a
sequence of intermediate representations H = h1, . . . , hT .
These representations are then used to produce a single vector
representation hc using mean- and max-pooling as well as
attention:
hc = [maxpool(H);meanpool(H); attention(H)]
which is, in turn, put through an MLP and used to make a
prediction yˆ of the toxicity of the utterance through a sigmoid
function:
yˆ = σ(MLP(hc)).
To demonstrate the effect of our adversarial attacks, we
experiment with fastText (Bojanowski et al. 2017) and ELMo
(Peters et al. 2018) embeddings, both of which are capable
of handling out-of-vocabulary words. For ELMo, we follow
the recommendations of Peters et al. (2018) and apply a 0.5
dropout to the representations and a weight decay of 1e-4 to
the scalar weights of all layers. We only fine-tune the scalar
weights and keep the language model weights fixed. We also
experiment with BERT, applying a single affine layer to the
embedding of the [CLS] token for classification and fine-
tune all weights. In addition, we report the performance of a
simple logistic regression baseline.
All hyperparameters are tuned on the Jigsaw 2018 dataset
and are listed in the Supplemental Material. Preprocessing
steps include tokenization, lower-casing, removal of hyper-
links and removal of characters that are repeated more than
three times in a row (e.g., “stupiiiiddddd” is converted to
“stupid”, but “iidiot” remains unchanged). All punctuation is
retained. For consistency across datasets, we evaluate models
on the “toxic”/“offensive” labels that include all types of
toxicity (obscenity, hate speech, targeted/untargeted offense,
and others). To convert probabilistic outputs of the models to
binary classes, we threshold the predictions to maximize the
F1 score on the training set. We focus on the ability of various
models to classify toxic content correctly since this is where
adversarial attacks are most likely to take place (users that
post non-toxic content are not motivated to have the system
misclassify their content as toxic).
The effects of our combined adversarial attacks are sum-
marized in Table 2. The logistic regression classifier is ef-
fectively incapable of handling out-of-vocabulary words and
performs the worst when noise is applied, with more than 50%
recall lost. Despite this limitation, however, its performance
does not drop to zero. This means that our obfuscation does
not completely remove all words that the logistic regression
classifier uses to detect toxicity. Indeed, we found that some
tokens that are quite obviously toxic (e.g., “motherf*cker”)
5Note that the Jigsaw 2018 and Jigsaw 2019 datasets are distinct
and we remove all examples in the Jigsaw 2019 dataset from the
Jigsaw 2018 dataset to prevent leakage. We use the Jigsaw 2019
dataset as a background corpus and not to train the model for the
Jigsaw 2018 dataset.
Noise Jigsaw 2018 OffensEval 2019Recall % Change Recall % Change
Logistic Regression
None 0.822 0.621
C+D 0.344 -58.2 0.246 -60.4
fastText-based model
None 0.902 0.633
C+D 0.485 -46.2 0.350 -44.7
ELMo-based model
None 0.887 0.596
C+D 0.569 -35.9 0.350 -41.3
BERT-based model
None 0.914 0.721
C+D 0.597 -34.7 0.342 -52.6
Table 2: The combination of character-level perturbations (C)
and distractors (D) leads to substantial loss of recall across
all models on both test sets.
were not included in our toxic lexicon. Therefore, it is likely
that improving the lexicon by finding a larger dataset or
manually curating more toxic words could further enhance
the effect of adversarial noise. Although neural models fare
slightly better, recall on the adversarial test sets still drops
significantly, with losses of over 30% in all cases.
We present randomly sampled examples of toxic sentences
that were misclassified by the fastText model due to the
adversarial noise in Table 3. Although not all of them retain
grammatical correctness, it is our view that their toxicity is
preserved and they should be properly handled by any toxic
content classifier
Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
Next we consider potential defenses against the aforemen-
tioned attacks: adversarial training and contextual denoising
autoencoder. We note that our objective with these
Adversarial Training
One possible defense is adversarial training (Szegedy et al.
2014; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), applying sim-
ilar noise to the training dataset. Adversarial training has
been applied successfully in tasks including machine trans-
lation (Belinkov and Bisk 2018) and morphological tagging
(Heigold et al. 2018). One limitation to this approach is that
one would need to know the details of the incoming attack,
including the lexicon the adversary might use to generate
noise. This is a major limitation, since adversaries can easily
change their lexicon. Another limitation is that there is no
guarantee that the adversarial noise will produce a reliable
pattern that the model can generalize to. For example, for
fastText embeddings, the same operation of swapping two
characters would produce completely different changes in the
subwords for different source words, resulting in different
changes in embedding space. The model could also overfit to
the adversarial noise, resulting in worsened performance on
clean data.
Contextual Denoising Autoencoder
With token obfuscation, the underlying problem is that small
character perturbations can cause large and unpredictable
changes in embedding space. To resolve this problem, the
underlying text representations themselves need to be robust
against character-level perturbations. To learn such robust rep-
resentations, we train a denoising autoencoder that receives
noised tokens as input and predicts the denoised version of
the token. When denoising tokens, the surrounding context
can provide strong hints as to what the original token was.
Some words like “duck” can be used both as obfuscations
of profanity and as standard language, meaning context is
crucial in effective denoising. Thus, we use a model that
takes the context a sequence of potentially noised tokens
as input and predicts the denoised tokens using contextual
information. We call this model the Contextual Denoising
Autoencoder (CDAE).
Due to its impressive performance across a wide range
of tasks, we use a Transformer (Vaswani et al. 2017) as the
underlying architecture. For word representations, we employ
the character convolutional neural network (CNN) encoder
used in the ELMo model. We feed the outputs of the CNN en-
coder to the Transformer with learned positional embeddings,
6 layers and 4 attention heads in each layer where the outputs
of each layer are of size 128. We show the overall scheme of
the CDAE in Figure 1. Not using wordpieces leads to massive
vocabulary size, especially with corpora obtained from the
web. We therefore use the CNN-softmax method combined
with importance sampling loss (Jo´zefowicz et al. 2016) to ac-
celerate training. We apply noise to 70% of tokens according
to the scheme in Section and mask all tokens uniformly with
a probability of 10%. We train our denoising autoencoder on
a random subset of the UMBC webbase corpus (Han et al.
2013) (a large-scale corpus constructed from web crawls) and
the Jigsaw 2019 dataset, taking care to remove any examples
from the Jigsaw 2018 dataset.
We note that this approach does require knowledge of what
character-level perturbations will be applied. However, the
space of possible character-level perturbations that retain
readability of the original token is limited. Crucially, unlike
adversarial training, the CDAE does not require knowledge of
the adversary’s lexicon, making this approach more suitable
for a wider range of attacks.
Effect of Defenses
In order to evaluate our proposed defenses, we measure AUC,
F1 score, and recall over the toxic class for all models. The
model architecture for CDAE is similar to the one we used for
fastText and ELMo. For CDAE, we use the mean of the final
4 layers of the model and concatenate them with fastText
embeddings, because we found that this leads to superior
performance.6 The detailed results of applying adversarial
6We hypothesize that this is because the fastText embeddings
were trained on much more data so captured some semantic aspects
that the CDAE did not.
Original Perturbed
Table 3: Examples of Toxic Sentences that were Misclassified by the fastText Model due to Adversarial Noise.
Model Train Noise Test Noise Jigsaw 2018 OffensEval 2019AUC F1 Recall AUC F1 Recall
Logistic None None 0.959 0.652 0.822 0.813 0.619 0.621
Regression None C+D 0.877 0.459 0.344 0.639 0.340 0.246C+D C+D 0.906 0.565 0.632 0.682 0.432 0.408
FastText
None None 0.973 0.674 0.902 0.850 0.670 0.633
None C+D 0.905 0.546 0.485 0.755 0.450 0.350
C+D C+D 0.932 0.591 0.643 0.763 0.532 0.540
ELMo
None None 0.970 0.654 0.887 0.843 0.644 0.596
None C+D 0.880 0.538 0.569 0.725 0.429 0.350
C+D C+D 0.917 0.568 0.696 0.759 0.549 0.579
BERT
None None 0.974 0.685 0.914 0.889 0.730 0.721
None C+D 0.901 0.596 0.604 0.734 0.462 0.342
C+D C+D 0.940 0.614 0.765 0.769 0.554 0.446
CDAE (ours)
None None 0.973 0.677 0.894 0.861 0.665 0.742
None C+D 0.918 0.597 0.597 0.747 0.479 0.388
C+D C+D 0.932 0.604 0.733 0.769 0.547 0.596
Table 4: Detailed results of models on two datasets. The best results for each setting are highlighted. C+D refers to character-
level perturbations and distractors combined. BERT generally performs strongest in clean settings. The CDAE is better at
handling noise without adversarial training, while BERT and CDAE perform comparably when adversarial training is introduced.
training as well as CDAE’s performance on the Jigsaw 2018
and OffensEval 2019 datasets are shown in Table 4. 7
Overall, we find that BERT performs well in the absence
of noise on both datasets (None–None setting). As expected,
the addition of noise hurts its performance. CDAE, on the
other hand, performs well in the noised test set without adver-
sarial training (None–C+D setting), indicating that it indeed
manages to at least partly denoise the adversarial utterances.
When additional adversarial training is introduced (C+D–
C+D setting), BERT and CDAE perform comparably, out-
performing all other methods. For OffenEval, we found that
BERT was more biased towards the non-toxic class compared
to the CDAE, causing it to have much higher precision but
slightly lower recall.
Adversarial training improves performance across the
board, although performance does not recover to the clean-
data standards. Interestingly, classifiers that were more vul-
7The OffensEval challenge evaluates models with a macro-
averaged F1 score over both classes, so our numbers are signifi-
cantly lower than the numbers reported there. We achieve a 0.84
macro-averaged F1 score, beating the state-of-the-art.
nerable to attacks before adversarial training tend to perform
poorly even with adversarial training. This implies that the
representation of text needs to be inherently robust for adver-
sarial training to be an effective defense. Despite using char-
acter CNNs, ELMo was more vulnerable to noise compared
to our CDAE (cf. 36% vs. 33% degradation in recall on the
Jigsaw 2018 dataset without adversarial training), showing
that character CNNs need to be explicitly trained to handle
noise/out-of-vocabulary words in order to exhibit robustness.
To better understand the robustness characteristics of our
two best models (BERT and CDAE) models, we perform
ablations under various noise settings (only character pertur-
bations, only distractors, adversarial training with a clean test
set). Results are shown in Table 5 and we summarize our
findings below.
Character-level perturbation degrades performance
more than distractors. For both datasets and models,
character-level perturbations lead to significantly larger drops
in performance across all metrics. This is reasonable, given
that obfuscation directly removes the toxicity signal. The
distractors, instead, simply dilute it.
Model Train Noise Test Noise Jigsaw 2018 OffensEval 2019
AUC F1 Recall AUC F1 Recall
BERT
None C 0.911 0.600 0.608 0.757 0.446 0.313
-6.44% -12.3% -33.4% -14.8% -38.8% -56.6%
C C 0.922 0.588 0.697 0.783 0.618 0.529
-5.37% -14.0% -23.8% -11.9% -15.3% -26.5%
None D 0.970 0.682 0.882 0.881 0.705 0.650
-0.47% -0.41% -3.56% -0.97% -3.49% -9.83%
D D 0.971 0.683 0.904 0.885 0.714 0.650
-0.33% -0.20% -1.10% -0.50% -2.21% -9.83%
C + D None 0.968 0.653 0.904 0.875 0.685 0.739
-0.59% -4.60% -1.08% -1.64% -6.16% -11.4%
CDAE
None C 0.925 0.610 0.642 0.758 0.465 0.354
-4.90% -9.87% -28.1% -11.9% -30.1% -52.2%
C C 0.932 0.596 0.706 0.786 0.629 0.533
-4.18% -11.9% -21.0% -8.72% -5.47% -28.0%
None D 0.965 0.669 0.810 0.864 0.672 0.708
-0.75% -1.20% -9.40% 0.36% 0.98% -4.50%
D D 0.970 0.672 0.882 0.862 0.691 0.683
-0.25% -0.74% -1.39% 0.15% 3.78% -7.87%
C + D None 0.968 0.651 0.912 0.858 0.655 0.721
-0.54% -3.84% 2.01% -0.35% -1.50% -2.81%
Table 5: Detailed Results for the CDAE and BERT (Percentages below are changes relative to the unnoised baseline). C refers to
character-level perturbations and D refers to distractors. Numbers in bold are best results for each setting/metric. Adversarial
training helps most against character-level perturbations. The CDAE is stronger against character-level perturbations, whereas
BERT performs well in the presence of distractors.
Adversarial training reduces performance on clean data.
Although adversarial training consistently improves robust-
ness to noise, it also slightly reduces performance on clean
data. This undesirable byproduct can probably be attributed
to models overfitting to the training noise.
The CDAE is more resilient against character perturba-
tions compared to BERT. We find that the performance of
the CDAE drops less with character-level perturbations both
before and after adversarial training. For example the recall
drops by 33% and 24% for BERT before and after adversarial
training, whereas for the CDAE the recall drop is 28% and
21% respectively. This reveals the advantage of the CDAE: it
is explicitly trained to address character-level perturbations.
BERT’s vulnerability to such noise cannot be easily remedied
due to its reliance to a wordpiece tokenizer.
BERT performs better in the presence of distractors com-
pared to the CDAE. In contrast to the CDAE, BERT is weak
to character-level perturbations but strong against distractors.
For both datasets, BERT performs stronger in terms of final
performance, aside from recall on OffensEval where BERT
was more inclined to predict the non-toxic class compared to
the CDAE for all settings. For the Jigsaw dataset, BERT per-
formance drops less in relative terms although the opposite
holds for OffensEval. For OffensEval, the distractors tended
to be shorter compared to the Jigsaw dataset since the original
text was also generally shorter. This difference in response
to distractors may suggest that BERT and the CDAE have
different robustness characteristics regarding distractors. A
possible explanation might lie in the architecture: BERT is
entirely self-attention-based while the CDAE features are
fed into a recurrent LSTM. The effect of the different archi-
tectures on the robustness characteristics towards distractors
remains an open question.
Ensembling. Based on our findings, we also examine the
performance of an ensemble of BERT and the CDAE, in
the hope that it will combine their advantages. The final
prediction is made with arithmetic mean of the two models’
predicted probabilities. Results are shown in Table 6. Indeed,
the ensemble outperforms both the single CDAE and BERT
models when tested on combined noise, exactly because
it combines their different robustness characteristics. This
suggests that although it may be difficult to train a single
model to be robust to all possible attacks, specialized models
can be trained to handle different attacks and their ensemble
may be a simple, cheap approach that will boost robustness
of the entire system.
Related Work
Toxic Content Classification. Since toxic content classi-
fication is a text classification task, traditional techniques
ranging from bag of words models (Georgakopoulos et al.
2018) to CNNs (Georgakopoulos et al. 2018) and RNNs (van
Model Train Noise Test Noise Jigsaw 2018 OffensEval 2019
AUC F1 Recall AUC F1 Recall
BERT None C+D 0.901 0.596 0.604 0.734 0.462 0.342C+D C+D 0.940 0.614 0.765 0.769 0.554 0.446
CDAE (ours) None C+D 0.918 0.597 0.597 0.747 0.479 0.388C+D C+D 0.932 0.604 0.733 0.769 0.547 0.596
Ensemble None C + D 0.921 0.590 0.725 0.774 0.505 0.404C + D C + D 0.942 0.628 0.799 0.827 0.612 0.604
Table 6: Results of the Ensemble of CDAE and BERT. The ensemble performs the strongest against combined noise among all
of our methods.
Aken et al. 2018; Gunasekara and Nejadgholi 2018) have all
been applied. Both van Aken et al. (2018) and Gunasekara
and Nejadgholi (2018) have shown that among the various
approaches, bidirectional RNNs with attention using pre-
trained fastText embeddings (Joulin et al. 2016) have strong
performance, with Gunasekara and Nejadgholi (2018) acheiv-
ing the best single-model performance on the Jigsaw 2018
dataset using a bidirectional LSTM with attention. Mishra,
Yannakoudakis, and Shutova (2018) developed an approach
that uses a character-level models to mimic GloVe (Penning-
ton, Socher, and Manning 2014) embeddings, thus inferring
the embeddings for unseen words. Crucially, this method can
only train the model on in-vocabulary words, meaning it is
incapable of handling targeted character obfuscations that do
not appear naturally in the GloVe vocabulary.
Noise and Adversarial Attacks in Text. Belinkov and
Bisk (2018) demonstrated the brittleness of neural machine
translation (NMT) systems to both natural and synthetic noise.
They showed that training on synthetically noised data im-
proves robustness towards similar synthetic noise but not to
naturally occurring noise (e.g. omissions). In contrast to their
work, we focus on targeted adversarial attacks that deliber-
ately attempt to fool a classifier. Multiple works have pro-
posed white-box attacks (attacks assuming access to model
gradients) in NLP for tasks such as NMT (Ebrahimi, Lowd,
and Dou 2018) and text classification (Ebrahimi et al. 2018).
Samanta and Mehta (2017) constructed a lexicon of words
to construct adversarial examples, which is similar but cru-
cially different from our approach in that they assume access
to model gradients. Other work has explored black-box at-
tacks (Liang et al. 2018). In particular, Hosseini et al. (2017)
generated adversarial attacks against the Google Perspective
API, a public API for detecting toxic content, and showed
the brittleness of this system. However, these methods rely
on multiple queries to the underlying prediction scores of the
model which are not always exposed to a user and can be seen
as a form of internal knowledge. Reddy and Knight (2016)
showed that the gender of posters on social media can be
obfuscated by using a background corpus to identify words
indicative of each gender and replacing those words with
semantically similar words. Our method differs in that we re-
place words with similar-looking instead of similar-meaning
character sequences, since our aim is to fool the system while
maintaining readability.
Defenses. One straightforward, yet non-scalable approach
to solving the problem of adversarial noise is to manually
curate a lexicon of the most frequent obfuscations (Wang
et al. 2014). On the other hand, Rojas-Galeano (2017) pro-
posed a method to automatically match obfuscated words to
their original forms using a custom edit distance function.
Although their approach is more scalable, it still requires
the manual construction of inflexible rules for measuring
the distance caused by different transformation and thus can
easily be circumvented by adversaries. Serra` et al. (2017)
proposed to use the errors from a class-conditioned character-
level language model to classify out-of-vocabulary words
as toxic or non-toxic. Sakaguchi et al. (2017) proposed the
semi-character level recurrent neural network (scRNN) as a
method of generating robust word representations. Although
their method showed strong performance in spell checking,
it is unable to handle anagrams (e.g. “there” and “three”)
and homoglyph substitutions, and ignores contextual infor-
mation. One limitation of these approaches is that they do
not consider the possibility of toxic words being mapped to
in-vocabulary words. For instance, “suck my duck” is likely
an obfuscation, but the word “duck” itself is common. These
problems require the usage of context: for instance, “duck”
in “the duck is swimming” is not toxic, but this can only be
inferred based on the context. Moreover, none of these ap-
proaches consider distractor injection as a potential method
of attack.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we show that we can easily degrade the perfor-
mance of state-of-the-art toxic content classifiers in a model-
agnostic manner by using a background corpus of toxicity and
introducing character-level perturbations as well as distrac-
tors. We also explore defenses against these attacks, and we
find that adversarial training improves robustness in general,
but decreases performance on clean data. We also propose the
Contextual Denoising Auto-Encoder (CDAE), a method of
learning robust representations, and show that these represen-
tations are more robust against character-level perturbations,
whereas a BERT-based model performs strongly in the pres-
ence of distractors. An ensemble of BERT and the CDAE is
the most robust approach towards combined noise.
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Appendix
Table 7: Homoglyph Confusion Map
Table 8: Hyperparameter Settings for BiLSTM model
Parameter Baseline
Learning rate 4e-3
Batch size 128
Training epochs 5
Input dropout 0.2
Word dropout 0.1
Output dropout 0.3
Learning rate schedule slanted triangular
Table 9: Hyperparameter Settings for BERT
Parameter Baseline
Learning rate 3e-5
Batch size 32
Training epochs 4
Learning rate schedule slanted triangular
Table 10: Top 100 Tokens of the Toxic Lexicon
Rank Token Rank Token Rank Token Rank Token
1 idiot 26 moronic 51 whores 76 stupider
2 idiots 27 jerk 52 dimwit 77 pussies
3 stupidity 28 assholes 53 f**k 78 asses
4 stupid 29 dumbass 54 suck 79 daft
5 idiotic 30 scum 55 suckers 80 schmucks
6 shit 31 jackass 56 buffoon 81 anal
7 asshole 32 fools 57 imbecilic 82 retarded
8 morons 33 jerks 58 dumber 83 asinine
9 stupidest 34 dumb 59 cretin 84 nitwit
10 imbecile 35 damn 60 stupidly 85 parasites
11 bullshit 36 hypocrites 61 loser 86 p***y
12 moron 37 bastards 62 clowns 87 fucked
13 imbeciles 38 bastard 63 bitches 88 wtf
14 fuck 39 sucks 64 shitty 89 slut
15 bitch 40 dammit 65 ridiculous 90 pigs
16 hypocrite 41 penis 66 clown 91 buffoons
17 idiocy 42 ignorant 67 silly 92 testicles
18 scumbag 43 arse 68 coward 93 dork
19 fucking 44 foolish 69 sucker 94 troll
20 dumbest 45 darn 70 garbage 95 disgusting
21 whore 46 sh*t 71 schmuck 96 f*ck
22 crap 47 rubbish 72 damned 97 liar
23 pussy 48 scumbags 73 hypocritical 98 dumbed
24 ass 49 vagina 74 lunatics 99 cursed
25 pathetic 50 fool 75 losers 100 masturbation
Original Perturbed
Table 11: Examples of original and perturbed comments (part 1).
Original Perturbed
Table 12: Examples of original and perturbed comments (part 2).
Original Perturbed
Table 13: Examples of original and perturbed comments (part 3).
